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Abstract The first section of this essay lays out Tom Cavanaugh’s helpful and convincing 
account of the enduring significance of the Hippocratic Oath in terms of how it responds to the 
problem of iatrogenic harm. The second section discusses something underemphasized in 
Cavanaugh’s account, namely, the key role of the virtue of piety within the Oath and the 
profession it establishes, and argues that this virtue should be regarded as integral to an authentic 
Hippocratic ethic. The third and final section briefly examines the connection between medicine 
and philosophy, focusing on how both should be seen as wisdom-seeking ways of life, and 
shows the relevance of this for regarding the virtue of piety as the key virtue of medical practice.   
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“… purely and piously I will watch over my life and my art.” 
—The Hippocratic Oath (tr. T. A. Cavanaugh in Cavanaugh 2018: 154) 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In Hippocrates’ Oath and Asclepius’ Snake: The Birth of the Medical Profession, Tom 
Cavanaugh provides a rich and illuminating exploration of the Hippocratic Oath; both in terms of 
its historical genesis and its enduring significance for medicine. I am fundamentally in agreement 
with Cavanaugh about the enduring significance of the Hippocratic Oath. However, I want to 
discuss a feature of it that is underemphasized but which I maintain is of great importance for 
medical practice today: namely, the centrality of the virtue of piety. In the first section of this 
essay I will lay out Cavanaugh’s account of the enduring significance of the Hippocratic Oath. In 
the second section I will discuss the role of the virtue of piety within the Oath and the profession 
it establishes and argue that this virtue should be regarded as integral to an authentic Hippocratic 
ethic. In the third and final section I will briefly examine the connection between medicine and 
philosophy, focusing on how both should be seen as wisdom-seeking ways of life, and I will 
show the relevance of this for regarding the virtue of piety as the key virtue of medical practice.   
 
2 The Problem of Iatrogenic Harm and Hippocrates’ Oath  
 
The foundational medical-ethical problem to which Hippocrates’ Oath seeks to respond, 
Cavanaugh contends, is “the problem of iatrogenic harm,” and this response “inaugurates 
medicine as a profession” (2018: 2–3; cf. 18–30). Harm that is iatrogenic – from the Greek 
iatros, meaning “physician,” and genos, meaning “born of” – is harm that is caused by a 
physician, and it can take three forms: First, there are wounds that are ineliminable from the 
work of healing (e.g., cauterizing to stop bleeding). Second, there are harms that are the result of 
physician error (e.g., giving the wrong dose of a drug). Lastly, there are “wounds of role-
conflation” (e.g., euthanizing a patient or assisting in suicide): “In the last type of wound (the 
most problematic), a physician adopts the role of wounder by deliberately injuring, thereby 
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abandoning the practice of medicine as an exclusively therapeutic activity” (2). While ethical 
medicine should certainly seek to minimize harms that result from physician error as far as 
possible, Hippocrates’ Oath, Cavanaugh maintains, responds above all “to the profound threat 
role-conflation poses to medical practice”: “By means of the Oath, Hippocrates … founds 
medicine as a profession devoted wholly to therapy, explicitly excluding deliberate wounding” 
(ibid.).  
 First of all, those who take the Hippocratic Oath solemnly pledge to act “for the benefit 
of the sick” to the best of one’s ability, and regard this as the proper end of medicine (56–57). 
Second, and relatedly, the Oath forswears deliberately causing harm, and specifies three major 
types of harm to be avoided: intentional killing, sexual exploitation, and violating confidence 
(57–69). The Oath does not offer comprehensive ethical guidance, but rather it “establishes 
boundaries within which ethical medicine takes place” (4). As Cavanaugh points out, “Horkos, 
the Greek word for ‘oath,’ is related to herkos ‘fence, that which encloses’” (43; cf. 127–128). 
The act of taking the Oath establishes medicine as a profession with its own internal ethic 
centered on “the golden medical rule”: help and do no harm (3, 121–134, 139–140). This means 
that medicine cannot be regarded as a morally neutral skill (or know-how) that can be used for 
diverse and incompatible ends (3, 23–25, 74–77, 123–124, 141–143). Hippocrates’ Oath, we 
might say (though Cavanaugh does not put it this way), regards medicine as morally special 
(rather than morally neutral) because it responds to a situation that is morally charged: an 
encounter with a sick person who is vulnerable and in need of medical help, and sometimes this 
need is particularly dire, where life itself and not just health is at stake. In taking the Oath one 
publicly and solemnly professes before all of those who may find themselves in this condition – 
which is all of us – that he or she is there to help and not to harm and so can be trusted to care for 
our medical need.  
   
3 The Virtue of Piety in Medical Practice  
 
As aforementioned, I am in agreement with Cavanaugh about the enduring significance of the 
Hippocratic Oath, and I find his discussion of it illuminating and largely persuasive. However, I 
think he underemphasizes the role of piety within the Hippocratic ethic.  
This is not to say that Cavanaugh gives no attention to the role of piety within the Oath. 
In Chapter 2 of the book he examines each part of the text of Hippocrates’ Oath, and so he 
discusses how it begins with swearing by gods and goddesses (43–49), and later he mentions that 
people taking different versions of the Oath today will often swear by God or whatever they 
regard as sacred (126). This communicates and establishes the seriousness and solemnity of what 
one is undertaking in the practice of medicine. Cavanaugh also discusses the part of the Oath 
where Hippocrates explicitly mentions piety, which is the following passage: 
 
I will neither give a deadly drug to anyone, though having been asked, nor will I lead the way to 
such counsel; and, similarly, to a woman a destructive pessary I will not give. But purely and 
piously I will watch over my life and my art. 
 
This is, not surprisingly, the most controversial passage of the Hippocratic Oath today, since it 
takes a stand on several major moral controversies: The Hippocratic physician is not to euthanize 
or assist in suicide and is also not to kill unborn human life. Cavanaugh notes that forswearing of 
euthanasia, assisted suicide, and abortion in the Oath “cannot be understood absent the juror’s 
concluding reference to purely and piously guarding his life and art”:  
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The Greek word for “purely” (hagnos), coming as it does after reference to not giving a deadly 
drug and not giving a life-destroying abortive, indicates that the Oath here addresses purity from 
blood-guilt. That is, the oath-taker forswears killing and thus will be pure before all the gods and 
goddesses in this respect … This sense of being free from blood on one’s hands before the gods 
becomes even more pronounced when one considers the complementing word for that here 
translated as “piously,” hosios. … Dikaios refers to human justice; hosios refers to righteousness 
before and with the gods. (58–59) 
 
Cavanaugh goes on to remark: “[The] Oath features a religious sensibility that forswears killing 
(including inchoate human life)” (60). 
 So why do I say that Cavanaugh underemphasizes the role of piety in the Hippocratic 
ethic? I say this because when he comes to defend the continuing validity of the Oath’s 
prohibition of intentional killing in Chapter 3, the religious sensibility and any reference to piety 
drops out. However, I want to contend that a religious (or at least a quasi-religious) sensibility 
that gives recognition to the sacred or the reverence-worthy is crucial for the viability of the 
Hippocratic ethic. The virtue of piety, as I understand it, is the virtue of being properly 
responsive to what is sacred or reverence-worthy, which includes human life. Piety also seeks to 
be properly responsive to the sources of our lives, such as our parents (hence we can speak of 
filial piety) and God or the gods (hence we can speak of religious piety).1 Being properly 
responsive here will involve showing reverence for human life and its sources, which includes 
recognizing claims of inviolability with respect to human life, since what is sacred is set apart in 
placing boundary markers upon what we are allowed to do with respect to it: for instance, we are 
not allowed to destroy human life intentionally; this is absolutely ruled out. It should be noted 
that although I am following Cavanaugh in speaking of a “religious sensibility” here, one does 
not need to be religious in any traditional sense (e.g., being a theist) in order to accept this 
sensibility. What is required is an affirmation of the reverence-worthiness of human life, where 
this is understood as setting limits upon our will. Hence, I think we can also speak of a quasi-
religious sensibility here.2   	
1 Cora Diamond writes: “The notions of piety and impiety are complex … One part of the notion of piety is the 
idea that we should treat the natural order of things with respect and awe. Another element is the idea of respect and 
gratitude as due to the sources of our life, which may be conceived to be God or the gods, our parents and ancestors, 
and our country. Another part of the notion of piety is the idea that actions that violate piety are properly regarded as 
outrageous or shocking. This outrage may manifest a sense that a wholly wrongful posture has been exhibited, a 
kind of will to dominate the natural order, a refusal to accept limitation, a challenge to God’s sovereignty or to 
honored and honorable traditions that should be taken as sacred” (2017: 31). See also Roberts 2017 for a helpful 
discussion of filial piety and religious piety. 
2 For more on these matters see McPherson 2020: 91–104. I am dealing here at the level of moral 
phenomenology (or sensibility), and it is then a further question – which I am not exploring – of what worldview 
might best support the moral phenomenology of the sacred or the reverence-worthy. Since I am not saying here that 
one has to believe in God or the gods in order to affirm the virtue of piety, my argument does not raise the 
“Euthyphro problem” (from Plato’s Euthyphro) of whether God (or the gods) loves piety because it is pious, or 
whether it is pious because it is loved by God (or the gods). My own view is that a theist should say that God loves 
piety because it is pious, that is, because it is inherently good or excellent (the other option makes morality 
arbitrary). I don’t think this makes God irrelevant for morality – as is often supposed – for four main reasons that a 
theist can affirm: First, God creates the world in light of a perfect understanding of the good and as ordered toward 
realizing this good. Second, God perfectly exemplifies the good, such that we can say that God is good (or the 
Good). Third, our responsiveness to God’s grace enables us to realize the good more fully in our lives. Finally, God 
perfectly loves the goodness that is inherent in the world, including in humanity, and in doing so helps to make 
manifest this goodness to us. See McPherson 2018: 94–96. 	
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 The main reason that Cavanaugh provides for upholding the Oath’s prohibition of 
intentional killing by physicians is that “one cannot care for another by destroying that other, 
even at his request”: “Therapy, caring for a subject, requires the subject to exist so that he may 
receive one’s care. … Killing performed by a doctor is oxymoronic, a practical contradiction” 
(85).3 He also provides five additional reasons for why physicians ought not to kill: First, killing 
by physicians undermines patient trust, and it renders “ambivalent the deaths of patients that do 
at times occur in the normal practice of medicine” (99). Second, killing by physicians can 
wrongly medicalize existential distress: “To lack control over the time and manner of one’s death 
partially defines the human condition. To regard this lack as a disease in need of a healer’s 
treatment errs fundamentally” (101–102). Third, killing by physicians “jeopardizes the welfare 
of vulnerable others, rendering them, too, susceptible to this injury”: “By killing or assisting in 
the killing of a patient, a physician indicates to reasonable others that having that disorder is a 
good reason to be killed by one’s self or others. … By assisting a patient’s suicide or by 
euthanizing a patient, a doctor suggests that killing solves human trials and tribulations” (102–
103). Fourth, “recourse to killing will retard the development of medicine as an art” (104). Fifth, 
and lastly, “by killing even in a putatively therapeutic manner, the physician undermines 
medicine’s ability not to be suborned into killing more generally and for diverse purposes” 
(ibid.).  
 I am sympathetic with all of the reasons given here, but what is striking is what is not 
said: namely, that physicians ought not to kill because it violates the sanctity of human life and 
so would be impious. Without this, I want to explain, there is a difficulty of absolutely ruling out 
killing by physicians. In his discussion of the wrongness of killing by physicians in Chapter 3, 
Cavanaugh seems to be operating too much within the prevalent disenchantment of our times, 
which does not recognize the realm of the sacred (or the reverence-worthy) and so lacks a crucial 
conceptual resource for making sense of absolute prohibitions.4 Hippocrates’ Oath, as 
Cavanaugh makes clear in Chapter 2, is not operating within such a disenchanted outlook, and in 
his defense of the Hippocratic ethic I think Cavanaugh needs to do more to resist this 
disenchanted outlook by defending something like what he describes as the Oath’s “religious 
sensibility that forswears killing (including inchoate human life).” Such a religious sensibility (or 
at least quasi-religious sensibility) that gives recognition to the sacred or the reverence-worthy, I 
contend, is in fact constitutive of a Hippocratic conception of the medical profession.  
 Consider again Cavanaugh’s main reason for opposing killing by physicians: “Therapy, 
caring for a subject, requires the subject to exist so that he may receive one’s care. … Killing 
performed by a doctor is oxymoronic, a practical contradiction.” This makes sense if we have 
already accepted the Hippocratic conception of the medical profession with its particular view of 	
3 Leon Kass similarly remarks that there can be “no benefit without a beneficiary” (2002: 34). But earlier he 
also comments: “For the [Hippocratic] physician, … human life in living bodies commands respect and reverence—
by its very nature. … The deepest ethical principle restraining the physician’s power is neither the autonomy and 
freedom of the patient nor the physician’s own compassion or good intention. Rather, it is the dignity and 
mysterious power of human life itself, and, therefore, also what the Oath calls the purity and holiness of the life and 
art to which the physician has sworn devotion” (32).  
4 The virtue of piety is overlooked in the most prominent defense of a virtue ethic approach to medical practice, 
namely, Pellegrino and Thomasma 1993, which discusses the following list of virtues: fidelity to trust, compassion, 
prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance, integrity, and self-effacement (Hippocrates’ “exhortation to lead a ‘pure, 
holy’ life” is mentioned on p. 184, but this is not explored, let alone defended; though the Hippocratic tradition is 
defended). The same is also true of Pellegrino and Thomasma 1996, which discusses the “theological virtues” of 
faith, hope, and charity in the context of medical practice.  
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what caring or healing consists in, including what limits or “fences” should be put around it. But, 
as Cavanaugh acknowledges, there are rival conceptions of the medical profession with different 
views of the healing mission. In particular, he discusses “Apollonian” and “Asclepian” 
conceptions of the medical profession as rivals to the Hippocratic conception. He writes: “[The] 
Apollonian physician will harm outright when doing so putatively reduces overall harm. … The 
Apollonian physician’s injuring in order to reduce harm assumes a divine character … The 
Asclepian includes killing (and thus acts somewhat divinely) while proposing that it is not 
injurious, but, rather, beneficial” (76). In other words, Apollonian and Asclepian physicians 
“play God” in not accepting any fundamental limits on what one can do in order to reduce 
suffering; they only disagree on whether killing in order to reduce suffering is to be described as 
a necessary injury or as in fact a benefit. (We don’t have to agree with the implicit theology; 
indeed, I think any God worthy of worship would not intentionally take innocent human life). 
Here we have conceptions of healing that are centered on reducing suffering and promoting 
quality of life. If someone is terminally ill and suffering greatly, such views would regard 
euthanasia and assisted suicide as forms of “healing.” In addition to quality of life conceptions of 
healing, there are also autonomy-centered conceptions of healthcare that are primarily concerned 
with respecting people’s autonomous choices with regard to their healthcare, which may involve 
deciding to be euthanized (or to be assisted in suicide) or to undergo an abortion procedure. So, 
the question that needs to be addressed is the following: Should the practice of medicine be 
centered on quality of life (or suffering-reduction), autonomy, or the sanctity of human life?  
The Hippocratic ethic is best understood as being guided by the sanctity of human life 
(and so also by the virtue of piety), which makes demands both for treatment that helps to restore 
someone to bodily health as far as possible and to avoid “playing God” by intentionally harming, 
including, above all, killing.5 This forms the basis of the practice of oath-taking that constitutes 
medicine as a profession within the Hippocratic outlook. Indeed, Cavanaugh discusses how oath-
taking is fitting when we are dealing with particularly “weighty matters” or “vital affairs,” which 
is the case with medicine, just as with getting married (when it involves a vow rather than merely 
a contract), assuming a public office, providing legal testimony, and entering religious life (124). 
He writes: “[Medicine] addresses our susceptibility to illness, decline, and death and our 
associated need for therapy. Caring for humans as beings subject to wounds—vulnerable—
constitutes a weighty doing; medicine has the gravity necessary for the solemn practice of oath-
taking. Hence, physicians fittingly take oaths” (125). Indeed, we can and should say that these 
weighty matters are weighty precisely because they concern the sanctity of human life, and thus 
we rightly recognize medicine as a solemn undertaking, as having real gravitas. 
But again I think this requires recovering and defending a “religious sensibility” (or 
quasi-religious sensibility) that “forswears killing (including inchoate human life)” because of 
recognizing something sacred or reverence-worthy about human life. Elizabeth Anscombe gets at 
something like this when she writes about a “religious attitude” of “respect before the mystery of 
human life” – or what I would call the sacredness or reverence-worthiness of human life – which 
she says is “not necessarily connected only with some one particular religious system.” 
Anscombe goes on to remark: “A religious attitude may be merely incipient, prompting a certain 
fear before the idea of ever destroying a human life, and refusing to make a ‘quality of life’ 
judgment to terminate a human being. Or it may be more developed, perceiving that men are 
made by God in God’s likeness, to know and love God” (2005: 269–270). Elsewhere she also 	
5 Leon Kass writes that on the Hippocratic view “the doctor is nature’s cooperative ally and not its master” 
(1985: 234).  
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speaks of “mystical perception,” which is another way of articulating a “religious attitude” 
toward human life, or what we can also call a sense of the sacred or the reverence-worthy. 
Anscombe thinks that this perception is in fact “as common as humanity”: for example, we find 
it in the perception that we dishonor our bodies in casual sex, in our sense that we owe respect to 
someone’s dead body, and in our horror at the evil of murder (2008: 186–187).6 If we take the 
last example, the evil of murder (that is, the intentional taking of innocent human life), the claim 
is that we cannot make sense of this evil simply in terms of how it robs someone of future 
enjoyable experiences or how it violates someone’s autonomy; rather, the horror of this evil is 
that it violates the profound intrinsic value of human life, that is, it violates that which should be 
regarded as inviolable. The general point is that we need a religious (or quasi-religious) 
sensibility regarding the sanctity of human life to make sense of common moral judgments. 
The case for not taking early (“inchoate”) human life can be more challenging. Although 
I think this is required by a belief in basic human equality (that is, a belief that all human beings, 
despite their manifold differences, possess the same fundamental dignity, or respect-worthiness, 
or “moral status”), which is widely though not always consistently professed today,7 it is 
nevertheless the case that many people have difficulty seeing early human life as being fully 
amongst us. Here I think we need to cultivate a sense of awe and reverence before the sheer fact 
of human existence, which again is a kind of religious or quasi-religious sensibility.  
One writer who has sought to articulate this sensibility is G. K. Chesterton. In his most 
well-known book, Orthodoxy, he writes: “[The] things common to all men are more important 
than the things peculiar to any men. … Man is something more awful than men; something more 
strange. The sense of the miracle of humanity itself should be always more vivid to us than any 
marvels of power, intellect, art, or civilization. The mere man on two legs, as such, should be felt 
as something more heartbreaking than any music and more startling than any caricature” (1986 
[1908]: 249–250). In other words, there is a wondrous preciousness to human life as such, and 
the “miracle of humanity” is that we should exist at all. Or, as we might also put it, the wonder is 
that there should be a universe and that it should give rise to beings with rational natures, that is, 
that we should be the part of the universe that is able to stand up, look around, reflect upon the 
world, and appreciate it.8 There is surely here – if anywhere – something worthy of awe and 
reverence. Later in Orthodoxy Chesterton also brings out the sheer gratuitousness and wondrous 
preciousness of existence when discussing Robinson Crusoe. He says that his favorite part of the 
novel is the list of things that were saved from the wreck of Crusoe’s ship, and he comments: “It 
is a good exercise, in empty or ugly hours of the day, to look at anything, the coal-scuttle or the 
book-case, and think how happy one could be to have brought it out of the sinking ship on to the 	
6 I am indebted to Cora Diamond (2017) for bringing these Anscombe passages to my attention. 
7 On this point, consider again Anscombe: “[A] woman of today may find a possibility of becoming pregnant, 
letting the baby grow to twenty eight weeks (because bigger ones are worth more) and then going somewhere where 
they will pay her for a late abortion, which yields the foetus for resale, say, as valuable material. If you act so, are 
you not shewing that you do not regard that human being with any reverence? Few will fail to see that. But the same 
is true of one who has an abortion so that she can play in a tennis championship; or for any reason for which 
someone might choose to destroy the life of a new human being. This lack of reverence, of respect for that dignity of 
human nature so wonderfully created by God, is a lack of regard for the one impregnable equality of all human 
beings. Lacking it, you cannot revere the dignity of your own human-ness, that is the dignity of that same human 
nature in yourself. You may value yourself highly as a tennis player or a natural scientist, but without a change of 
heart you cannot value yourself as being a human, a Mensch. For you have shewn the value you set on a human life 
as such. You are willing to extinguish it as suits you or as suits the people who want you to do so” (2005: 72). 
8 I am echoing Kurt Vonnegut here: “I was some of the mud that got to sit up and look around” (1963: 221). I 
thank John Houston for this reference. 
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solitary island. But it is a better exercise still to remember how all things have had this hair-
breadth escape: everything has been saved from a wreck [that is, non-existence]. … Men spoke 
much in my boyhood of restricted or ruined men of genius: and it was common to say that many 
a man was a Great Might-Have-Been. To me it is a more solid and startling fact that any man in 
the street is a Great Might-Not-Have-Been” (267). And if we can say this of any human being in 
the streets, then we can also say this of any human being in the womb.   
Another important way to cultivate this sort of religious (or quasi-religious) sensibility 
that is properly responsive to the claims of the sanctity of human life in the practice of medicine 
is precisely through taking the Hippocratic Oath (or a contemporary version of it that is faithful 
to its enduring moral message) and seeking to live out the medical profession founded upon it. In 
other words, the Oath and the medical profession that arises from it are not simply based on a 
belief in the sanctity of human life, but rather the sense of solemnity that it cultivates also helps 
us better to appreciate the sanctity of human life. The Oath and the profession following from it 
are revelatory; they enable a transfigured vision whereby the reverence-worthiness of human life 
can come into view. This is a revelation that depends upon enactment of this reverence-
worthiness through treating human beings as reverence-worthy.  
 
4 Medicine and Philosophy 
 
I want to conclude here by briefly examining the connection between medicine and philosophy 
(as understood by the ancients), which is relevant to the case I have made for seeing piety as the 
key virtue of medical practice. In his Decorum, Hippocrates himself highlights the connection:   
 
Between medicine and the love of wisdom [that is, philosophy] there are no great differences; in 
fact medicine has all the things that lead toward wisdom: dislike of money, reverence, modesty, 
reserve, sound opinion, judgment, calm, steadfastness, purity, knowing speech, knowledge of 
things useful and necessary for life, dispensing of that which cleanses, freedom from superstition, 
pre-eminence divine. (cited in Kass 1985: 224) 
 
According to its ancient Greek conception, philosophy is a “way of life”; indeed, it is a kind of 
“spiritual exercise,” which involves “care of the soul” through examination of one’s life and the 
world in which we live (see Hadot 1995; 2004). The philosopher seeks wisdom, that is, holistic 
understanding that is expressed in living well, which requires a transformation of being and of 
vision. In the case of medicine, the focus is on “care of the body,” but, as Hippocrates indicates, 
this cannot be entirely separated from care of the soul (that is, the psyche). Etymologically, to 
heal is to make whole, and we cannot be whole while attending only to the body, or only to the 
soul; we must attend to both.9 Dealing with disease and injury raises questions of an existential 
or spiritual nature that need to be addressed: for example, questions about the meaning and value 
of human existence (see Sulmasy 2006: 16–17). Hence, medicine too must seek wisdom and 
should be regarded as a way of life and a kind of spiritual exercise; it is a way of life, I have 
suggested, that is guided by the virtue of piety (or reverence). Indeed, Hippocrates suggests that 
both medicine and philosophy properly understood are guided by reverence, and this certainly 
seems true for many of the great ancient philosophers.10 Hippocrates says that reverence leads to 	
9 In fact, there is an etymological connection with “the holy” as well, and Kass remarks: “The insight that drew 
the holy, the healthy, and the whole from a common etymological root may point to the deepest wisdom, not only 
for medicine but perhaps also for how we are to live” (1985: 246). 
10 Consider these remarks from Hadot on one instance: “[For] Aristotle the life of the mind consists, to a large 
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wisdom, though it is also part of wisdom to recognize what is reverence-worthy and to be 
properly responsive to it. In the foregoing I have suggested that the wisdom upon which the 
Hippocratic ethic ultimately depends includes a cultivated sense of awe and reverence before 
human life, and undertaking the Oath and living it out can be an important part of cultivating 
such wisdom about our existence.      
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